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Hollywood Writers and the Gig Economy 
Catherine L. Fisk† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The notion that large numbers of workers are independent contrac-
tors not entitled to unionize or to the protections of employment law is 
a product of twentieth-century legal categories that are a poor fit for 
twenty-first-century companies and labor markets. But it is an error to 
assume that the free market cultural ethos of worker entrepreneurial-
ism in the high-skill sector of the gig economy—by which I mean short-
term jobs, often with little supervision except as to results—is at odds 
with the basic framework and assumptions of labor and employment 
law.1 In my view, it is both feasible and normatively desirable to extend 
to gig economy workers the protections of labor and employment law. 
Though some scholars sympathetic to protective labor legislation assert 
that some ( but not all) Progressive and New Deal Era statutes must be 
amended to cover short-term, decentralized work of the gig economy,2 I 
 
 † Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. I am grateful 
for research assistance from John Sirjord. Part II of this article draws on CATHERINE L. FISK, 
WRITING FOR HIRE: UNIONS, HOLLYWOOD, AND MADISON AVENUE (Harvard Univ. Press 2016). Part 
III draws on interviews I conducted with thirty-two writers and three executives in Los Angeles 
from August 2013 to February 2016, research described in more length in Catherine L. Fisk & 
Michael Szalay, Story Work: Non-Proprietary Autonomy and Contemporary Television Writing, 
TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA (2016). 
 1 JEAN-CLAUDE VINEL, THE EMPLOYEE: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2014); KATHERINE V.W. 
STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 
(2004); DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED ECONOMY: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014); Guy Davidov, Who Is a Worker? 34 INDUS. L.J. 57 
(2006); Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor Problem 
Without Redefining Employment, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279 (2011); Veena Dubal, Wage Slave 
or Entrepreneur? Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 65 (2017). 
 2 See Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-
First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker, THE HAMILTON PROJECT DISCUSSION PAPER (Dec. 
2015) (“[C]ourts do not have sufficient authority to ensure a fully efficient solution to the problems 
created by the emergence of independent workers,” a category of workers who “provide[ ] personal 
services only when [they] choose[ ] to do so” and whose work relationship “can be fleeting, occa-
sional, or constant, at the discretion of the independent worker” and who differ from employees for 
the crucial reasons that “they do not make themselves economically dependent on any single em-
ployer, they do not have an indefinite relationship with any employer, and they do not relinquish 
control over their work hours or the opportunity for profit or loss.”). 
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contend that the experience of writers shows that current law can easily 
accommodate bargaining by gig economy workers. Independent, entre-
preneurial, short-term workers have bargained collectively for eighty 
years to the significant benefit of themselves and the industry in which 
they work, and neither labor law nor antitrust law should be seen as 
precluding collective bargaining in the gig economy. 
Hollywood writers since the advent of the movie industry in the 
first decade of the twentieth century have worked in a gig economy. 
Embracing twin roles as labor and entrepreneurs, writers in the 1930s 
formed a union and created an administratively complex but functional 
system for regulating wages, conditions of employment, and intellectual 
property rights in an industry characterized by short-term, episodic, in-
dependent, and erratically supervised work in geographically dispersed 
locations. Their union, the Writers Guild of America, bargains on a sec-
toral, multi-employer basis on behalf of writers at the low end and the 
very high end of pay, power, and responsibility. The Writers Guild rep-
resents workers who employers in other industries might deem inde-
pendent contractors or supervisors ineligible for unionization. In a 
sense, to quote Kate Andrias’s important new work, the “new labor 
law”3 has been working in Hollywood for eighty years. 
Part II of this Article describes the history of the Writers Guild in 
Hollywood and shows how studios and production companies tried un-
successfully to exploit the employee–independent contractor dichotomy 
to block writer unionization in the 1930s and 1940s. The companies 
eventually abandoned the fight to deem writers to be independent con-
tractors and have been bargaining collectively with writers ever since. 
Then, as now, employers deployed the independent contractor notion 
strategically against protective labor legislation and, especially, to ena-
ble enforcement of antitrust law to thwart worker collective action. 
Then, as now, deployment of antitrust law to block worker collective 
action was an illegitimate strategic exploitation of legal ambiguity in 
labor and antitrust law.4 This history shows that the contemporary use 
 
 3 Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016). The power of talent unions in 
Hollywood stems, in part, from the breadth of their membership and bargaining on a sectoral, 
multiemployer basis. Multiemployer bargaining has long been crucial in the construction trades 
because of the short-term, gig economy nature of that labor market as well. Id. at 19 n.79. 
 4 On antitrust law and gig economy workers, see Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities 
of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 969, 988–90 (2016) [here-
inafter Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities]; Sanjukta Paul, Uber as a For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-
Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 38 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. – (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn. 
com/abstract=2817653 [hereinafter Paul, Uber as a For-Profit Hiring Hall]. On antitrust and col-
lective action against independent contractors in the high-skill sector, see Federal Trade Comm’n 
v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (agreement among court-appointed 
counsel for indigent criminal defendants not to accept new clients until government increased fees 
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of the independent contractor label has historical antecedents, and it 
also suggests that neither labor law nor antitrust law should bar collec-
tive negotiation by independent workers. 
Part III turns from history to ethnography, showing that writers in 
Hollywood today do not see the demands of entrepreneurial self-promo-
tion to be inconsistent with their status as labor. I interviewed thirty-
two working television writers and three executives from 2013 to 2016.5 
From senior writers and showrunners6 down to entry-level and staff 
writers, every writer in my sample described unionization as being cru-
cial to his or her standard of living and to the high quality of contempo-
rary TV. Thus, collective bargaining by independent workers today is 
an important and effective way of accommodating employer flexibility 
with employee protection. My study also shows that collective bargain-
ing works in part because the Writers Guild represents all writers at 
every level of pay and authority, from showrunners down to assistants. 
Even though some Hollywood writers work under conditions that re-
semble those of independent contractors or supervisors—categories of 
worker who are not entitled to unionize or bargain collectively—writers 
insist on their status as employees and union members. The problems 
that are said to arise from independent contractor and supervisor un-
ionization have never materialized. 
For all their many faults and stresses, talent union-management 
relations in Hollywood appear to be relatively stable precisely because 
“talent” (writers, actors, and directors) understand they benefit from 
 
paid to appointed counsel constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of federal an-
titrust law and was not immunized by First Amendment). 
 5 This Article is based on semi-structured in-person interviews with thirty-two writers and 
three network or studio executives currently working in U.S. film and scripted TV. The sample 
was not random nor representative of all working TV writers. It was a snowball sample, and I 
oversampled women (nine of thirty-two), showrunners (twelve of thirty-two), and people working 
on so-called quality shows. Most worked in drama, though a few worked in comedy. The vast 
majority worked primarily in TV, most in both cable and broadcast. Two worked primarily in film, 
and two making webisodes for internet-only distribution platforms. All but two are or appeared to 
be white (I did not ask about race or ethnicity). They ranged in career stage, from a few with about 
five years’ experience, to a few with experiences dating to the late 1960s; most have been working 
in TV for ten to twenty years. All but two of the writers were Writers Guild members, and a few 
have been Writers Guild officers; one other writer was a novelist, and one was an Animation Guild 
member. Each interview lasted between sixty and one hundred-forty minutes, and all occurred in 
Los Angeles between August 2013 and February 2016. 
 6 Showrunner is the term used to describe the executive producer of a television show, who 
is usually the head writer and is sometimes the show’s creator. The showrunner hires and super-
vises the writing staff, and oversees almost every aspect of production. See Catherine L. Fisk & 
Michael Szalay, Story Work: Non-Proprietary Autonomy and Contemporary Television Writing, 
TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA (2016); see generally BRETT MARTIN, DIFFICULT MEN: BEHIND THE 
SCENES OF A CREATIVE REVOLUTION (2013) (describing the significance of the showrunner in con-
temporary television and profiling the showrunners of several acclaimed shows). 
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unionization, and the companies understand they benefit from the part-
nership with the talent guilds. All of that turns on talent (from the high-
est to the lowest paid) being “employees” within the meaning of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 
II. WRITERS’ EMPLOYMENT STATUS IN THE 1930S AND 1940S 
From the beginning of the industry, Hollywood writers knew they 
needed constantly to promote themselves, to switch jobs, and to en-
deavor to get their contracts renewed by proving to producers that they 
were worth what they were paid. Writers may have been neoliberal en-
trepreneurs,7 but they were also committed unionists. Writers call their 
organization a guild, not a union, because it protects their interests as 
professionals, as highly paid and often quite autonomous masters of a 
craft. And whenever they have had to strike to secure protection for 
their rights as authors—in 1948, 1952, 1959–60, 1973, 1981, 1985, 
1988, and 2007–08, always involving compensation for re-use of their 
work in new media—they expressed awkwardness about resorting to a 
strike and picketing.8 They take pains to distinguish themselves from 
people who “work on a loading dock” (as TV writer Bob Barbash said 
about picketing writers during the 1960 strike), or coal miners or farm-
workers (as writer-showrunners said to me about the 2007–08 strike).9 
But they still have to act like labor to protect their rights as authors. 
Legal disputes over whether workers are employees arise only in 
the context of particular laws creating rights or prohibitions. Three 
such laws have been important in the history of film and TV writers, as 
will be explained more fully below. 
In the early history of the movie business, the most important law 
pertaining to employee status was the Copyright Act of 1909, which 
made the employer the author of any “work made for hire” created by 
an employee within the scope of the employment.10 When writers are 
not “employees,” that is, are not subject to the direction and control of 
 
 7 Sociologist Tomas Marttila has argued that neoliberalism transformed an existing concept 
with a specific meaning (entrepreneur as the founder of a business enterprise) into an all-purpose 
aspiration for how all people should be and “a general role model for how to get things done.” 
TOMAS MARTTILA, THE CULTURE OF ENTERPRISE IN NEOLIBERALISM: SPECTERS OF 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 4, 5 (2013). 
 8 See CATHERINE L. FISK, WRITING FOR HIRE: UNIONS, HOLLYWOOD, AND MADISON AVENUE 
161, 246–48 (Harvard Univ. Press 2016). 
 9 MIRANDA BANKS, THE WRITERS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SCREENWRITERS AND THEIR GUILD 
8 (2015) (quoting Bob Barbash); Interviews with Writer 1 and 12, in Los Angeles, Cal. (2013, 2014). 
Henceforth writer interviews are referred to by Writer [number] to preserve writer anonymity. On 
the 1981 strike, see Aljean Harmetz, Tentative Accord Reached in Strike of Screen Writers, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 1981. 
 10 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
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the employer in the creation of the work,11 the employer can acquire the 
copyright in the work only if the writer chooses to assign it.12 
The legal status of writers became crucial at two other points in the 
history of the broadcast and screen entertainment industries. First, the 
National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947, protects only an “employee’s” right to unionize, and excludes from 
protection “any individual having the status of an independent 
contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor.”13 The 
significance of the employee-independent contractor distinction matters 
not only for whether workers have a statutory right to unionize without 
employer retaliation but also for whether their union will be exempt 
from antitrust scrutiny.14 
Writers in film, and later radio, and still later television, initially 
disclaimed being employees, both as a matter of professional dignity 
and to keep intellectual property rights in their work. The studios and 
networks insisted writers were employees because of the work-for-hire 
rule of copyright. Being the owner at the moment of creation freed the 
studios from having to demand a formal assignment of the copyright 
once the script was complete, and also affected the ability of the studio 
to apply for a renewal of the copyright.15 Thus, studios insisted that 
writers were employees, assuming a writer who was paid to write was 
an employee without regard to the extent of supervision or control of his 
or her work. 
A. Writers as Employees in the 1930s: Employees under the Wagner 
Act 
Although screenwriters in the 1920s and early 1930s chafed at the 
low-status connotations of the employee title and at the loss of owner-
ship of the copyrights in their scripts, they went along with the em-
ployee designation because it was the price of getting work in Holly-
wood.16 But when the opportunity to negotiate collectively for more 
control, advance notice of layoffs, a minimum wage, and control over 
screen credit arose with the enactment of the National Labor Relations 
 
 11 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1990). 
 12 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
 13 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3). 
 14 See infra Part II.B. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Actor’s Equity Unable to Join Art Federation—Reason that Federation of Labor Must Be 
Considered, THE SCRIPT 1 (May 6, 1922); Will Hays Told About What the Guild Stands For—Mayor 
Woods Writes to Him of Photoplaywrite Schools and Others, THE SCRIPT 1, 3 (June 3, 1922). Both 
sources are available in the Margaret Herrick Library of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and 
Science, Beverly Hills, CA. See generally FISK, supra note 6, chapter 2. 
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Act of 1935, Hollywood writers saw that embracing the legal label “em-
ployee” was the key to collective action.17 
Writers typically were hired on short-term contracts lasting from 
several weeks to six months or a year. In March 1936, for example, 
screenwriter Seton Miller, a Yale graduate who had been working in 
Hollywood for fifteen years and had about thirty-five screen credits, 
signed a one-year employment contract with Warner Brothers Pictures 
at the rate of $1250 a week (in 2014 dollars, $21,300 per week, or $1.1 
million for the year).18 In Miller’s contract, which was typical in all re-
spects except pay, the writer promised to “conscientiously perform the 
services required of him hereunder solely and exclusively for and as re-
quested by the Producer,” to do so “whenever and wherever the Pro-
ducer may request or deem necessary or convenient,” and to “promptly 
and faithfully comply with all requirements, directions, requests, rules 
and regulations made by the Producer.”19 The writer promised not to 
write or work on “any stage, radio, dramatic, or motion picture produc-
tion” other than for his own studio, or to allow his name to be used to 
promote any production except by that studio.20 
Writers had to agree that the copyright in anything they wrote or 
dreamed up during the contract term belonged to the studio as a work 
made for hire, and to execute a standard certificate of authorship stat-
ing that the studio was the author of anything they wrote for any me-
dium. The studio, for its part, had the right, with seven days’ advance 
notice, to lay off its writers without pay for twelve consecutive weeks 
during the contract year.21 Studios usually had the right to renew the 
contract several times for up to seven years, but writers did not have 
the same option to renew if the studio didn’t want them.22 
 
 17 See FISK, supra note 8, chapter 2. 
 18 Seton I. Miller Contract, March 24, 1936, item number 12631B, Warner Bros. Archive, Uni-
versity of Southern California; IAN HAMILTON, WRITERS IN HOLLYWOOD, 1915–1951, 35 (1990); 
MARC NORMAN, WHAT HAPPENS NEXT: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SCREENWRITING 95 (2007). 
 19 Seton I. Miller Contract, supra note 18. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. This kind of contract was used for decades in film and was adopted for writers working 
in TV. For example, in 1953, John Twist, who had a career writing westerns and other B-movie 
action pictures from the 1930s to the early 1960s, signed a similar year-long contract with Warner 
Bros. with a one-sided option for a one-year renewal. John Twist Contract, October 28, 1953, item 
number 12840A, Warner Bros. Archive, USC. On the typicality of the pay in Miller’s contract, see 
CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON, HOLLYWOOD TV: THE STUDIO SYSTEM IN THE FIFTIES 237, 252 (1994); 
LEO ROSTEN, HOLLYWOOD: THE MOVIE COLONY, THE MOVIE MAKERS 324 (photo. reprint 1970) 
(1940) (data on 1938 salaries of writers at Warner Brothers, Twentieth Century Fox, and Columbia 
showed that thirteen percent received $1000 or more a week, and six percent received $1500 or 
more a week); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N.L.R.B. 662, 689 (1938) (describing terms of 
standard writers’ contracts submitted in case seeking union representation of writers). 
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The language in writers’ contracts was boilerplate, yet the power 
the contracts gave to studios was complete. As anthropologist Hortense 
Powdermaker said in her 1950 ethnography, Hollywood, the Dream 
Factory, talent contracts established a feudal relation, as they bound 
the worker to the studio for years if the studios chose to exercise their 
renewal options, and yet studios had the power to terminate writers at 
will.23 Leo Rosten, who worked as a screenwriter after earning degrees 
in social science at the University of Chicago and the London School of 
Economics, made a similar observation in the 1940 report he made with 
a team of social scientists who came to Hollywood to study the movie 
business under the auspices of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rock-
efeller Foundation. As Rosten put it in that study, writers’ legal status 
determined their working conditions and their self-conception. Being an 
employee was “the key to many of the problems, dilemmas, and agonies 
of the writer in Hollywood”: 
He is handed collaborators whom he dislikes. He is ordered to 
introduce a tap dancer into a story about an African safari. He 
is asked to “add a few jokes” to the scene he fought to keep poign-
ant; or to “speed up the story” at precisely the point where he 
wanted to develop the characters; or to invent a “smart” but un-
natural opening, or a “sock” but phony climax. He is an em-
ployee.24 
Or, as Powdermaker’s ethnography put it, a “bon mot in the com-
munity is that ‘writers in Hollywood do not have works but are work-
ers.’”25 Because they neither owned nor controlled what they wrote, they 
did not “have works.” Because of their subordinate position to studio 
heads, writers were workers. And because of both of these things, writ-
ers embraced their status as labor and formed a union.26 
The contract terms that writers most resented and that drove them 
to unionize were those that gave the studio the right to control every 
aspect of what writers wrote, along with one-sided renewal options, the 
work-for-hire doctrine, and the power to lay off writers without notice. 
Such terms made it logical that even people as highly paid as Miller 
would describe themselves as labor. Radical writers embraced the idea 
of writing for a wage as a political stance because of the membership it 
 
 23 HORTENSE POWDERMAKER, HOLLYWOOD, THE DREAM FACTORY: AN ANTHROPOLOGIST 
LOOKS AT THE MOVIE-MAKERS 85 (1950). 
 24 ROSTEN, supra note 22, at 306–07 (emphasis added). 
 25 POWDERMAKER, supra note 23, at 150. 
 26 Id.; Jill B.R. Cherneff, Dreams Are Made Like This: Hortense Powdermaker and the Holly-
wood Film Industry, 47 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 229 (1991). 
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was imagined to confer in the working class. But in embracing their 
status as labor, film writers had to distance themselves from the criti-
cally lauded literary writers with whom they sometimes wished to iden-
tify. They did so in part because money was the recompense for the loss 
of autonomy, and in part because film writing could be quite factory-
like. Screenwriters at Paramount in the 1930s jested about writing on 
an “assembly line” run by producers “who doled out dramatis personae” 
to teams of writers and who would “assemble” the dialogue “jigsaw 
style, into a final script.”27 Mary McCall, Jr., a successful writer of the 
1930s and 1940s, said she wanted a big salary, “not because I need it,” 
but because it would: 
give me authority. Then when a producer says, “Look, sweet-
heart, I have a terrific angle on this opening; we fade in on a 
bed,” I can say, “That’s silly,” and he will listen to me because I 
will be so very expensive. I say “That’s silly” now, but he rarely 
listens to me.28 
But still it required an attitude adjustment for writers to embrace 
the legal label “employee.” However odd it seemed that the most suc-
cessful writers would form a union, writers at all levels of pay and pres-
tige realized that unionization benefitted the vast majority of writers 
financially. And even those who earned huge salaries (which writers 
describe as being like winning a lottery29) knew that studios would 
never concede that screenwriters, like New York playwrights, were not 
employees. If they were not employees they would own their scripts, 
could veto changes to the script, and (they thought) could not be ban-
ished from the set during filming. The status of employee was, thus, 
about more than just copyright ownership or the right to form a union. 
It was about trying to reclaim some modest degree of creative power 
and respect through collective bargaining.30 
For their part, studios also adopted contradictory positions with re-
spect to writers’ legal status as labor. While resisting giving writers cre-
ative control and insisting writers were employees for purposes of the 
copyright work-for-hire doctrine, studios opposed writers’ efforts to bar-
gain collectively by arguing to the National Labor Relations Board 
 
 27 HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 184. 
 28 ROSTEN, supra note 22, at 81 (quoting Mary C. McCall, Jr., Hollywood Close Up, REVIEW OF 
REVIEWS, May 1937, at 44). 
 29 The metaphor that finding a job was like winning the lottery has persisted, as it was used 
by more than one of my interview subjects. A staff writer (Writer 25) on an acclaimed drama said: 
“Hollywood is a fucking lottery, you know? Especially for talent.” Interview with Writer 25. 
 30 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N.L.R.B 662, 669, 686–87 (1938). 
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(NLRB) that the writers were not employees eligible to unionize. Writ-
ers, the studios said, performed services that were “creative and profes-
sional in character, whereas the Act applies to the more standardized 
and mechanical employments.”31 Unions were for “wage earners in the 
lower income brackets.”32 Screenwriters were not employees because 
they were not required “to observe regular office hours or to maintain 
office discipline,” nor “to produce any fixed amount of work,” and they 
were “free to develop screen material in accordance with their own 
ideas.”33 The employers renewed this same argument with respect to 
radio writers in the 1940s, TV writers in the early 1950s, and freelance 
film writers in 1959 when writers struck over payment for reuse of ma-
terial on TV. The argument consistently failed because studios insisted 
on control over what writers wrote.34 
When studios in 1937 argued that writers were not employees eli-
gible to unionize, the NLRA covered “any employee”;35 there were no 
exclusions for highly paid or managerial workers, independent contrac-
tors, professionals, those who were not closely supervised, or those who 
did mental rather than manual labor.36 Indeed, during the drafting pro-
cess Congress omitted a proposed provision requiring that a worker 
must be under the continuing authority of the employer to qualify as an 
employee, and thus supervision was not essential to the employee defi-
nition.37 So writers pointed to their individual employment contracts, 
which, like Seton Miller’s, gave studios control over the time, place, and 
content of their work. Writers testified that producers exercised that 
control in assigning writers to particular stories or parts of stories, in 
moving a writer from one project to another, and in requiring writers to 
 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. The NLRB’s findings about the industrialized process of script development was drawn 
from testimony of both writers and studio executives, including Benjamin Cahane, Vice President 
of Columbia Pictures, who described in detail the way that the producer chose a literary property 
and hired a writer to adapt it for the screen and then assigned other writers to write dialogue, to 
add jokes, and so forth. My account draws on the NLRB decision; on Ronny Regev’s dissertation, 
for which she read the full record of the case in the NLRB archive in the National Archive, College 
Park, Maryland, Case No. XXI-R-149, Boxes 515, 516, 517, 518, Ronny Regev, “It’s a Creative Busi-
ness”: the Ideas, Practices, and Interaction that made the Hollywood Studio System, Ph.D. diss., 
Princeton University (2013), http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01jm214p26m; and on 
NANCY LYNN SCHWARTZ, THE HOLLYWOOD WRITERS WARS (1982). 
 34 On this in 1959, see BANKS, supra note 9, at 142. 
 35 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
 36 Congress added an exclusion for independent contractors and supervisors as part of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), and the Supreme Court added exclusions for managerial and 
confidential employees. NLRB v. Hendricks Cty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 
(1981); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (holding university faculty are managerial 
and therefore not employees); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Corp., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
 37 ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 37–38 (2004). 
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attend story conferences and demanding writers follow the producer’s 
“very definite ideas as to the changes to be made in a script.”38 
The NLRB decided screenwriters were employees because produc-
ers had the power (even if it was not always exercised) to dictate the 
content of writers’ work, to assign parts of stories, and to stipulate 
where writers were to write.39 The Board noted but found unimportant 
that some writers were employed on a “free-lance basis under contracts 
providing for a week-to-week continuation of the employment or for the 
completion of a certain piece of work at a specified aggregate compen-
sation,” because “there is no essential difference between a free-lance 
writer and a writer working under contract for a term in the manner in 
which they performed their work and that the only difference between 
the two is one of length and tenure of employment.”40 
B. Writers as Employees in the 1940s: Employees under 
Taft-Hartley and Antitrust Law 
The question whether writers were employees or independent con-
tractors arose for a second time when radio writers tried to unionize in 
the 1940s, but the legal context was different. The hardest-fought dis-
pute over writer unionization in radio was with the ad agencies that 
handled every aspect of production of radio dramas and some variety 
shows. (The radio networks directly employed staff writers for some 
shows, and network staff writers succeeded in unionizing earlier than 
the writers employed by ad agencies and independent producers.)41 Alt-
hough the Radio Writers Guild (RWG) briefly presented itself to ad 
agencies as a professional association of independent contractors, it 
quickly decided that freelance writers were employees and that it was 
a union.42 The resistance of advertising agencies to the RWG was not 
about money. Most agencies, especially for prime-time shows, which 
were sponsored by major advertisers, paid writers more than what the 
RWG proposed as a minimum. They resisted because they refused to 
accede to Guild demands for air credit or writer ownership of scripts. 
To thwart the RWG’s demand for bargaining, ad agencies made two le-
gal arguments, both of which resonate with today’s gig economy work-
ers. 
 
 38 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 7 N.L.R.B. at 688. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 687–89. 
 41 FISK, supra note 8, chapter 3. 
 42 See Bulletin 1439A, infra note 45. 
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First, ad agencies insisted that the writers worked for their clients 
(the sponsors), not for the agencies, and the clients did not give them 
authority to negotiate any agreement. Moreover, the agencies claimed, 
any agreement negotiated by a committee of advertising agencies would 
not be binding on the shows’ sponsors, who, the agencies stated, were 
the actual employers of the people who wrote their shows.43 In contem-
porary legal parlance, the agencies claimed they were not the joint em-
ployers of writers and, rather, that the sponsors were the employers. 
Radio writers could not accept this argument because if they were to 
get anywhere in bargaining, they needed to bargain with the entity that 
effectively controlled their terms of employment—the ad agency. The 
agencies’ effort to disclaim employer status quickly foundered on the 
facts, as the agencies, hired, fired, paid, and supervised writers, and the 
sponsors had little involvement except to approve scripts.44 
The agencies’ second, and more plausible, legal argument was that 
writers were not employees of anybody but were, instead, independent 
contractors. Therefore, the agencies argued, Radio Writers Guild and 
its demands for collective bargaining were a federal crime under the 
Sherman Act, rather than protected concerted activity under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.45 
As scholars of labor and antitrust have observed for decades, the 
announced purpose of the antitrust law was to target corporate monop-
olies and trusts that controlled the production or sale of sugar, tobacco, 
oil, and a host of other products in the Gilded Age. Whatever Congress’s 
intent, the Supreme Court held labor unions and collective bargaining 
agreements to fall within the statutory prohibition on conspiracies in 
 
 43 Memorandum from A.K. Spencer to Miss. Pederson & Mr. Colwell (June 21, 1945), Edward 
G. Wilson Papers, J. Walter Thompson Archive, Hartman Center for the Study of Advertising, 
Perkins Library, Duke University. 
 44 See FISK, supra note 8, chapter 3. 
 45 See, e.g., Bulletin 1439A, American Association of Advertising Agencies, Radio Writers’ 
Guild Seeks Minimum Basic Agreement with Agencies (June 22, 1945) (on file with author) [here-
inafter Bulletin 1439A]; Bulletin 1441A, American Association of Advertising Agencies, A.A.A.A. 
Radio Committee Counter Proposal to Radio Writers Guild (July 17, 1945) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Bulletin 1441A]; Memorandum from Edward G. Wilson to John Reber (Apr. 1, 1947). 
Memorandum from Edward G. Wilson, Radio Writers’ Guild (Aug. 15, 1947) (on file with the J. 
Walter Thompson archive). The agencies first proposed that the RWG should go to the NLRB to 
be certified as a union representing employees, hoping that the Board would decide that freelance 
radio writers were not employees, or at least not employees of the ad agencies. The RWG’s lawyers 
advised against going to the NLRB for a definition of freelance writers because it was too hard to 
predict what the Board might do, as there “are not many precedents in literary fields on which the 
NLRB can go in deciding a dispute of this sort.” Erik Barnouw to membership of RWG. May 15, 
1948. Edward G. Wilson Papers. All of these documents are in the Edward G. Wilson Radio Writers 
Guild Files in the J. Walter Thompson archive at the Duke University, Perkins Library, Hartmann 
Center for the Study of Advertising. 
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restraint of trade in Loewe v. Lawlor,46 a 1908 decision arising as the 
result of sustained efforts of a group of hatmakers in Danbury, Connect-
icut to improve their working conditions through unionization.47 When 
Congress amended the federal antitrust law in the Clayton Act of 
1914,48 labor secured a specific statutory exemption for labor organiza-
tions and collective bargaining; as amended, the statute provides that 
“the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce” 
and that “[n]othing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed 
to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations . . . or to 
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from law-
fully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof.”49 The Supreme Court 
once again resisted the congressional protection for unions,50 but in 
1940 the Court overruled itself and read the antitrust law to allow 
workers to form unions under the specific statutory exemption and un-
ions and employers to engage in collective bargaining under what the 
Court termed a non-statutory exemption.51 
As Sanjukta Paul has observed, there is some lack of clarity about 
how the statutory and non-statutory antitrust exemptions apply to 
workers who work somewhat autonomously.52 Part of the difficulty lies 
in the dramatic overbreadth of the statutory language of section one of 
the Sherman Act, which makes “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade” illegal.53 
It is simply not possible to read it literally, and the Supreme Court does 
not,54 because, as Justice Brandeis once noted, restraint is the very es-
sence of every contract.55 The Court has held that some strikes or con-
certed action for increased compensation by some independent contrac-
tors constitute unlawful horizontal restraints of trade and possible 
illegal price fixing, a per se violation of antitrust law,56 “particularly if 
 
 46 208 U.S. 274 (1908). 
 47 Id.; DANIEL ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE 
LIBERALISM (1995). 
 48 38 Stat. 730 (1914); 15 U.S.C. § 12. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (interpreting the Clayton Act as 
exempting from antitrust liability only the activities of labor unions and their members that were 
legal before the Clayton Act). 
 51 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 
(1940). 
 52 Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities, supra note 4, at 969, 977. 
 53 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 54 See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 55 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also Nat’l Soc’y of 
Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–88 (1978) (quoting Justice Brandeis positively). 
 56 Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining Rights 
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it is aimed at affecting prices or other elements of the bargain and often 
even if it is not, is illegal price-fixing, unless some specific exception 
applies.”57 In other cases, however, the Court has found efforts of inde-
pendent workers to be outside the scope of antitrust law.58 In the con-
text of civil rights boycotts aimed at forcing white-owned businesses to 
hire black employees, the Supreme Court held that the First Amend-
ment protected the boycotters from state antitrust liability.59 
The most closely analogous antitrust case involving the efforts of 
writers to protect themselves from the concerted power of producers 
was a 1945 decision of the Second Circuit about the Minimum Basic 
Agreement (MBA) between the Dramatists Guild and New York theatre 
producers. The suit, Ring v. Spina,60 was filed by a producer of a play, 
Stovepipe Hat, who got into a dispute with the playwrights over alleg-
edly unauthorized changes in the play.61 When the playwrights invoked 
arbitration under the MBA and terminated the production contract, the 
producer sued them, along with the Dramatists Guild and the Authors 
League, alleging that the MBA violated the federal antitrust law. The 
Dramatists Guild asserted it and its MBA were within the labor exemp-
tion from antitrust liability, just as were the Screenwriters Guild and 
their agreement with the movie studios. It set the terms on which work-
ers would sell their labor in a labor market in which workers switched 
jobs frequently in an industry dominated by an oligopoly of relatively 
few employers. And concerted action was necessary among the workers 
in order to counteract the collective power of the relatively few employ-
ers who contracted for their services.62 
 
for “Dependent Contractors”, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 168–69 (2005). 
 57 Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities, supra note 4, at 977; see also FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 
476 U.S. 447 (1986) (collective action by independent dentists); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs, 435 
U.S. 679; Spence v. Se. Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n, 789 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (D. Alaska 1990) (antitrust 
analysis involving association representing independent contractor pilots). Social or economic ben-
efits do not constitute exceptions. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n (SCTLA), 493 U.S. 
411, 423–24, 428 (1990) (holding that attorneys’ “concerted action in refusing to accept further 
CJA assignments until their fees were increased was . . . a plain violation of the antitrust laws”); 
see also Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 
290 (1985) (“This Court has long held that certain concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts are 
so likely to restrict competition without any offsetting efficiency gains that they should be con-
demned as per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”). 
 58 In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), 
the Court rejected antitrust liability for railroads and truckers (some of whom may have been self-
employed drivers and others trucking companies), in their dueling publicity and lobbying cam-
paigns seeking advantages for their respective industries in the long-haul freight business. 
 59 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 60 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 61 See generally id. 
 62 See generally id. 
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The court of appeals did not see it that way because playwrights 
sold their completed work to producers, unlike movie writers who were 
mainly hired to write. The court reasoned that an “author writing a 
book or play is usually not then in any contractual relation with his 
producer.” And “[i]f and when he does contract, he does not continue in 
the producer’s service to any appreciable or continuous extent thereaf-
ter.” The court distinguished the dramatists’ collective agreement from 
the screenwriters’ on the ground that the wages in the dramatists’ 
agreement “are not remuneration for continued services, but are the 
terms at which a finished product or certain rights therein may be 
sold.”63 
Ring v. Spina was of intense interest to the advertising agencies 
and radio networks. The agencies wanted to use the decision to argue 
that radio writers were sellers of intellectual property like dramatists, 
not sellers of labor like screenwriters, and therefore collective bargain-
ing would be illegal. Relying on Ring, the agencies asserted that they 
were under no legal obligation to bargain and any collective agreement 
about terms of employment would violate the antitrust law. As Erik 
Barnouw, president of the RWG later recalled, these arguments gave 
writers “a skillful runaround” for almost a decade.64 
It was indeed a runaround because what the agencies asserted in 
negotiations differed from what at least some of their lawyers believed. 
JWT’s in house counsel, Edward Wilson, concluded that JWT radio staff 
writers and freelancers were employees of the agency because JWT con-
trolled what and when they wrote. On Lux Radio Theatre, for example, 
Wilson privately conceded that the head writer, Sanford Barnett, had a 
desk in JWT’s Hollywood office and worked with JWT staff in adapting 
plays or movies for radio, and was “subject to supervision by the client, 
through us.” On Kraft Music Hall, Wilson described working conditions 
for writers that looked a bit like film and a lot like what quickly became 
standard in TV, and that were enough to establish writers as agency 
employees: 
 
 63 Id. at 652. Ring v. Spina did not spell the end of the Dramatists Guild. Later iterations of 
the litigation avoided definitively ruling that bargaining agreements between dramatists and the-
atre producers were unlawful antitrust conspiracies, although at various points both playwrights 
and producers accused each other of violating law by conspiring to set the price of labor. The Dram-
atists Guild renegotiated the MBA on the same essential terms over the decades since, and bills 
to clarify the law have been introduced in Congress but never passed. Meanwhile, playwrights own 
the copyrights in their scripts and have creative control of stage productions of them. Producers 
pay playwrights a minimum percentage of the box office, share earnings beyond the minimum, 
and split receipts from sales of film rights. Jessica Litman, The Invention of Common Law Play 
Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1420–22 (2010). 
 64 ERIK BARNOUW, MEDIA MARATHON 112 (1996) (on file with the J. Walter Thompson ar-
chive). 
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A JWT representative or director would meet with the writers 
in what they refer to as a premise meeting. At this meeting the 
writers would be told who the guest artist would be the following 
week and our representative and the head writer would attempt 
to work out the situations around which the scripts would be 
written. Each writer would then go off and prepare the portions 
which were assigned to him. Their efforts would be turned in and 
coordinated by the head writer. If their material was okay, they 
had nothing more to do. However, if the whole thing did not 
shape up all the writers including the head writer would be 
called in and they would work together until they completed the 
script. Each writer would get [paid] the same amount each week, 
no matter how much work he had to do.65 
In a legal memo prepared for JWT clients, Wilson concluded “the 
script writers on your shows are employees,”66 later adding that they 
were “undoubtedly employees of the sponsor,” but because the agency 
“act[s] for the sponsor in supervising them, it seems clear that we 
should handle all matters relating to their work and should, therefore, 
do the negotiating.”67 JWT did briefly consider the possibility of restruc-
turing its relationship to its clients such that the agency would employ 
the freelancers and sell or lease scripts to the clients, but ultimately 
decided not to.68 
As a matter of legal doctrine, freelance writers did not easily fit into 
a box. On the one hand, they worked independently. Many wrote at the 
hours they wanted, without supervision over their work, at least until 
the script was done and a producer asked for revisions. Many writers 
proposed their own topics, and the structure of the finished work was 
dictated more by the conventions of the medium than by the employer. 
On the other hand, every media company insisted (then as now) on the 
power to force the writer to rewrite. Rod Serling was forced in 1955 to 
rewrite a story about the Emmet Till lynching to remove even the slight-
est hint of race. Erik Barnouw, a successful radio writer who served for 
several years as president of the Radio Writers Guild in the 1940s, was 
forced to remove any reference to gas chambers in a radio play about 
 
 65 Memorandum to Miss Pederson & Mr. Colwell from A.K. Spencer, June 21, 1945. Edward 
G. Wilson Papers. 
 66 Memorandum from Edward G. Wilson, Radio Writers’ Guild, supra note 45, at 2. 
 67 Id. at 1. 
 68 Cf. Edward G. Wilson, Radio Writers’ Guild (Jan. 12, 1948) (on file with the J. Walter 
Thompson archive); Edward G. Wilson, Radio Writers’ Guild (Jan. 19, 1948) (on file with the J. 
Walter Thompson archive). 
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the Nuremberg Trials because the program sponsor was a public util-
ity.69 
The agencies wanted to narrow the category of writers to which the 
agreement would apply to exclude a vague category of “independent 
contractors,” without being able to explain who was an employee or in-
dependent contractor. The RWG proposed that a writer would be an 
employee and covered by the collective agreement if “the company has 
the right by contract to require him to perform personal services in 
making revisions, modifications or changes,”70 and that independent 
contractors were those who sell or license rights to material “without 
contracting to perform personal services with respect to revision, modi-
fication or change.”71 But the companies would not agree, because they 
insisted on the right to demand revisions from anybody. The agencies’ 
inability to define the scope of their proposed exclusion ultimately 
proved fatal to their negotiating position.72 Since the agencies insisted 
that radio writers were not their employees, and sponsors insisted that 
they weren’t their employees either, but both insisted on control over 
their work, the Radio Writers Guild thought the effort to exclude an ill-
defined group of writers was close to bad faith.73 
In the end, the definition of employee writers covered by all Writers 
Guild agreements in film, radio, and TV74 focused on the employer’s 
power to require writers to make revisions to scripts.75 Employees un-
der the MBA are those who “write literary material . . . where the Com-
pany has the right by contract to direct the performance of personal 
services in writing or preparing such material or in making revisions, 
 
 69 SCHWARTZ, supra note 33, at 46. 
 70 See supra note 68. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See John Crosby, Radio in Review: Revision, Modification or Changes, newspaper clipping 
from unidentified source, Sept. 17, 1948, in Edward G. Wilson Papers. Letter from Leonard T. 
Bush, Chariman Compton Advertising, Inc., Louis N. Brockway, Young & Rubican, Walter Craig, 
Benton & Bowles, Inc. to Erik Barnouw, Nat’l President & Roy Langham, Nat’l Executive Secre-
tary (Sept. 13, 1948) & attached Definition of Employee (Sept. 13, 1948) (on file with the J. Walter 
Thompson archive). 
 73 Erik Barnouw to Leonard Bush, Sept. 22, 1948. Edward G. Wilson Papers. 
 74 The fight over the legal status of freelance writers as employees or independent contractors 
was repeated in 1952 in television, but more briefly. As had the movie studios in 1938 and ad 
agencies in the 1940s, TV producers wanted to declare that writers were employees for purposes 
of copyright law, but not for purposes of labor law or for purposes of tax. The writers prevailed. See 
Minutes of a regular meeting of the Executive Board of the Screen Writers’ Guild (Sept. 3, 1952, 
8:00 p.m.) (on file with the Writers Guild of America, West, Los Angeles, Cal.). At the time I con-
ducted my research, they were not open to the public. They have since been digitized and may be 
available to researchers through application to the Writers Guild Foundation. 
 75 Letter from David Miller to Mr. Brockway 4 (Jan. 20, 1949) (on file with the J. Walter 
Thompson archive). 
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modifications, or changes therein.”76 As Erik Barnouw later reflected, 
the lack of creative control—an issue that galled many radio, film, and 
TV writers—proved the key to their ability to bargain collectively for 
the rights of attribution, partial ownership, compensation, and respect 
that they secured in the MBAs in radio, film, and TV writing. It was the 
power of the employer to force the writer to make revisions—the right 
of control—that defined who was an employee.77 
III. WRITERS AS EMPLOYEES NOW 
Turning from history to ethnography, this Part of this Article re-
veals that writers working in Hollywood television today, like writers 
in the 1930s and 1940s, do not see the demands of entrepreneurial self-
promotion to be inconsistent with their status as labor. Even though 
some Hollywood writers look rather like what in other fields would be 
deemed independent contractors or supervisors—and, therefore, not 
employees entitled to bargain collectively—writers insist on their sta-
tus as employees and union members. They position themselves as la-
bor for four main reasons. First, they recognize the importance for all 
writers of maintaining solidarity. Second, even the most powerful and 
successful feel vulnerable to studio cost-cutting and to being fired, and 
they value the collectively bargained pension and health insurance pro-
grams. Third, they feel that unionization is necessary to preserve writ-
ers’ claims to residuals and separated rights, which are all that writers 
get of the intellectual property rights in their work. Fourth, they recog-
nize that studios and networks have the real power over content, and 
so they position themselves as labor to maintain a sense of artistic in-
tegrity and autonomy and to distance themselves from the bad judg-
ments made in corporate suites. 
A. Solidarity 
The writers and showrunners I interviewed were unanimous in de-
scribing their good fortune to be able to find work in a fiercely competi-
tive labor market. They insisted that writers’ solidarity and unioniza-
tion is what makes writing jobs good in an industry where, as one 
showrunner said, “people literally would [work] for free. . . . So it’s good 
that the Guild is there to make sure that there’s minimums and protect 
people.”78 They recognize that TV writers enjoy a degree of affluence 
 
 76 WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, 2014 THEATRICAL AND TELEVISION BASIC AGREEMENT, art. 
1.B. (theatrical), art. 1.C. (television) (May 2, 2014). 
 77 BARNOUW, supra note 64, at 122. 
 78 Interview with Writer 2. 
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that makes it difficult to think of themselves as labor in any traditional 
sense of that word. They acknowledge a wide gulf in pay, status, and 
power between writers and the below-the-line workers who are, in an 
important sense, the creators of TV. Yet they attribute some of their 
success to the Writers Guild collective bargaining agreement with the 
Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers (AMPTP), which 
protects writers against some downsides of short-term, episodic work. 
The negotiated rules requiring minimum payments to all employed 
writers, and screen credit and payment of residuals to credited writers, 
are significant, even if they offer protection to relatively few and privi-
leged workers. And they all acknowledge the importance of union-nego-
tiated health and pension benefits. As a staff writer on an acclaimed 
drama explained: 
I never met talent that didn’t, as a general matter, think the 
Writers’ Guild was fantastic. I mean, we can debate about 
whether we should have had a strike and all that, but . . . I know 
a lot of [writers who are] ex-lawyers and bankers and doctors 
and people who are educated beyond Hollywood and I never 
heard anyone express the idea that . . . there’s some irony in 
their membership in a union. I feel like we benefit tremendously 
[from being in the Writers’ Guild]. It’s hard to imagine how much 
worse—I mean, we wouldn’t have health. I mean, just look at the 
situation of reality writers [who are not unionized]. It’s terrible, 
terrible.79 
As that writer observed, many TV writers (all in my sample) are 
graduates of elite colleges and universities. Several are lawyers. Many 
others worked as journalists or playwrights before working in Holly-
wood. One is a doctor. They are extremely articulate. Writing for TV is 
collaborative and social, but it also requires writers to be quite aggres-
sive in finding a job and in working collaboratively so that they keep 
their job and are hired for the next season and the one after that. As 
one said, “[t]o succeed in the business you have to be able to sell, to 
pitch—whether it’s . . . pitching a show, or pitching yourself in a hiring 
meeting, or pitching to the network that the idea they want to throw 
out is really worth taking a second look at.”80 
There was a surprising degree of unanimity among the interview 
subjects in their answers to the question of why writing for TV remains 
a union job, and why even showrunners—who hire and fire writers and 
 
 79 Interview with Writer 25. 
 80 Interview with Writer 30. 
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manage the production of TV shows—are union members and conceive 
of themselves as labor. Almost everyone identified the minimum com-
pensation negotiated by the Guild as significant for junior writers, even 
if their own compensation exceeded the contract minimum, and every-
one who mentioned the generous health insurance and pension plans 
noted that writers at every pay level need health insurance and a pen-
sion.81 Many explicitly linked the protections of the Minimum Basic 
Agreement as being the absolute minimum of fairness given that writ-
ers sell the intellectual property rights in their work as a condition of 
hire.82 Many also noted the importance of Guild determination of screen 
credit.83 And, when asked to explain why new media companies like 
Netflix and Amazon agreed to the WGA Minimum Basic Agreement, all 
told the same story: talented writers insist on working under the juris-
diction of the WGA and studios and production companies want tal-
ented writers, so Amazon and Netflix agreed to recognize the Guild. 
Showrunners embraced their legal status as employees who can 
unionize and bargain collectively rather than as management who 
cannot,84 in part because solidarity between them and staff writers 
makes it harder for studios and networks to divide writers by setting 
the showrunners’ interests against those of other writers in WGA 
negotiations. In the 2007–08 strike, showrunners lent their economic 
and cultural clout to protect the economic position of all writers, from 
those currently employed to write a TV show, to those who were retired 
and living on a pension and residuals, and to those waiting tables and 
working on a screenplay. A very successful showrunner, who at the time 
of my interview was running the show he created and could not possibly 
be fired because he had attained the status of auteur that is rarely at-
tained by any TV writer, emphasized the importance of solidarity in the 
2007–08 writers strike. He said he shut down production of his show 
during the strike, costing himself and his crew substantial money, be-
cause “I’m obsessed with fairness.” He acknowledged the unusual na-
ture of the senior writer’s position in a strike (“everyone is a writer and 
a producer, so the writing part of you is on strike, but the producing 
part of you is not”) but said that the strike worked because of “the power 
of that collaboration, of collectivization; it was amazing.” This act of sol-
 
 81 Interview with Writers 2, 7, 16, 21, 31, 32, 33. 
 82 Interview with Writers 12, 21, 31, 32. 
 83 Interview with Writer 21. 
 84 See NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (managerial employees do not have a 
right to unionize under the NLRA); 29 U.S.C. § 152 (excluding from statutory definition of 
employee protected by the NLRA “any individual employed as a supervisor”). 
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idarity, the showrunner continued, which “cost about $250 million prob-
ably, for those three months” and disrupted the Golden Globe awards 
and threatened to disrupt the Academy Awards, “feels like justice.”85 
The notion that solidarity among writers is crucial to the industry 
takes many shapes. Sometimes writers frame it as their obligation to 
preserve a system that was created long ago and that has made writing 
a good job. A junior TV writer said, “Someone a lot smarter than me, 
several years ago, felt the writers deserved residuals. Someone who had 
thought this through.”86 A senior film writer and Writers Guild officer 
framed union solidarity as the need to preserve a historical legacy and 
the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement that prior generations 
of writers fought for, what he called “signature advances of the Guild.” 
“So, between, you know, pension, health, residuals, credits—all of that 
stuff—that was done before I got here, you know and I am the benefi-
ciary of it.” In the end, he said, he is involved with the Guild because “I 
want to make sure of something that seems increasingly difficult. That 
it remains possible to make one’s living as a writer. And if one does 
make a lot of money for the people who are employers, he gets some-
thing approaching a fair share.87 
Sometimes the duty to protect the Guild’s “signature advances” 
through acts of labor solidarity is framed as what is necessary for a 
healthy industry. A showrunner explained, “I think that there is this 
sense among showrunners that we benefit from a healthy ecosystem of 
writers that are well taken care of.” Explaining that he had recently 
been to Korea to speak to the television writers’ association there, “I 
think that their industry is profoundly hurt by the lack of a writers’ 
union.” Noting that a union “professionalizes a class of people who, un-
der other circumstances, are really easy to exploit,” the showrunner ex-
plained that “if you want a healthy world of writers who can write high 
quality television that can be exported, well, one the price you pay for 
that, the price that corporate entertainment pays for that, is that 
they’re going to pay a little bit more to sustain and train all of these 
people at the lower levels with the idea that eventually they can be suc-
cessful at creating their own shows.” Without a union to sustain and 
train junior writers, he concluded, a successful entertainment industry 
is “very hard to sustain over long periods of time.”88 
Even writers who believe that their individual success means that 
they no longer need the protection of the Guild identify some benefits of 
 
 85 Interview with Writer 31. 
 86 Interview with Writer 15. 
 87 Interview with Writer 21. 
 88 Interview with Writer 16. 
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unionization for writers. One showrunner said that, although “we’re not 
working in mines and . . . [i]t’s a pretty wealthy life that we lead, still 
without the union there would be no residuals.” “Look at the people that 
did The Lucy Show. Never made a penny off The Lucy Show. And it’s on 
somewhere everywhere in the world at every moment of the day and 
they made nothing.”89 
B. Vulnerability 
To make a career as a writer is a highly uncertain prospect; as a 
Guild officer put it, some writers’ careers are “as short as a professional 
athlete’s.”90 As a staff writer on an extremely successful show explained: 
“[S]ometimes your sensibility will match up with something that’s going 
by, and you’ll have a good little moment. And then you’ll get spit out, 
because you’re not an agent or an executive. You’ll think you’re worth-
less for five years, and then you’ll get another chance.”91 Writers have 
little job security as shows are cancelled and a writer who succeeded in 
one genre may find himself out of a job and his work out of fashion. As 
a senior writer explained, his agent will say, “This isn’t what people are 
buying.”92 This is true even of showrunners, who themselves do the hir-
ing and firing of staff writers, because, as one who had recently been 
fired said, they know that they can be fired by the studio.93 Even those 
who are offered a job find they have little bargaining power at the entry 
level. “Once you are a producer, you can negotiate money, but staff 
writer, story editor, executive story editor, it’s pretty much: ‘This is 
what you’ll get paid, like it or lump it.’”94 
Showrunners are, in some senses, management. They have 
tremendous control over which writers are hired and the hours they 
work, even though the MBA controls what writers are paid. As a staff 
writer—a former playwright—explained: 
[I]t depends on the showrunner how long you spend at the office. 
You can’t set your own hours like you can in TV movies or fea-
tures or any of that. You can’t. You’re just not in control over 
your life. They may send you to set [when your episode is being 
filmed]. . . . When I was working on “Franklin & Bash,” if it was 
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 91 Interview with Writer 25. 
 92 Interview with Writer 13. 
 93 Interview with Writer 12. 
 94 Interview with Writer 19. 
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my episode, . . . I had to be there at 6:00 in the morning. My 
husband was out of town. So then, it’s a whole set of . . . 
She trailed off before describing the struggle to arrange childcare.95 
When she was working on a show on which the showrunner was a father 
of five children, ages six months to eleven, “[w]e went in at 9:30 and we 
were gone by 6:00, almost every single night. . . .  I was home in time 
for dinner, every night, which is . . . it’s absurd. [Interviewer: So it’s just 
whatever the show runner wants—A:] Completely.”96 
Even successful showrunners often find themselves relatively pow-
erless in the face of network and studio executives. As the creator and 
showrunner of a successful HBO show explained, when HBO executive 
Carolyn Strauss called to say: 
“You can’t have as many characters, you know, you’re getting too 
expensive. You’re going to have to fire some actors, or tell them 
that if they want to be on the show, they’re not going to be regu-
lars anymore.” It was like, to me, it was like, insane. . . . So I had 
to make the phone calls to these three actors and say, you know, 
if you want to be on this show, you’re going to make, I don’t know 
how much less money—one of these guys had a family—like, a 
lot less money, money that’s going to really affect your life in a 
huge way. . . . And it was a really hard call to make.97 
Another writer described the experience of a showrunner who was 
pressured by a network and studio to cut production costs because of 
declining ratings. The network and studio demanded that the showrun-
ner cut $600,000 from the budget, even if it meant cutting “$50 a week 
from the assistants,” but they refused even to consider cutting the 
$75,000 per episode package fee paid to the talent agency even though 
the agency had done nothing to earn it except introduce the showrunner 
to a big-name producer several years before. What explains this? Ac-
cording to the writer, “There’s this incredibly nepotistic, back-scratch-
ing bullshit set of relationships between networks and executives and 
agents, and they protect these pieces of the system, which really make 
no economic sense.”98 
Although showrunners exercise supervisory functions in hiring and 
firing staff writers and managing budgets, they feel they are labor 
because they, too, are vulnerable to firing or to the decision of a network 
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to cancel a show. But they also feel that they must stand with those who 
are even more vulnerable. As one put it, “I got a call during the strike 
from a lawyer friend of mine who was like, ‘What the fuck are you guys 
doing? You’re management. Who pulled you into behaving like labor?’”99 
He answered his own question by saying that he had to stand with all 
writers because they are all vulnerable to the decisions of studio and 
network executives. Acknowledging that the strike “was a lot of really 
rich people striking basically for future writers,” and that “none of the 
issues of the strike had anything to do with most of us” successful 
writers,100 he nevertheless recognized that as a group writers are 
vulnerable. True, said one, “[t]he amount of money that it actually 
meant to [showrunners] was a rounding error, like they would never 
even notice in the difference in their salary.”101 Or, said another, “[i]f I 
want two more pennies on a DVD, I can negotiate that for myself.”102 
Showrunners insisted their participation in the strike “was not just 
noblesse oblige.”103 They joined the strike, one showrunner explained, 
because “everybody is aware that they benefitted from those protections 
when they were coming up, and in most cases, truly in most cases, they 
are aware that they probably wouldn’t be writers without that.”104 
Showrunners were keenly aware that while they placed themselves on 
the labor side of the law’s labor-management divide, their pay and 
social status made the iconic act of labor protest—picketing—an 
embarrassment that the studios were all too happy to exploit. The 
studios derided the acts of protest, one showrunner and film director 
said, as “millionaires holding picket signs.”105 Showrunners describing 
the 2007–08 strike were at pains to note writers are not “coal miners,” 
“not truckers,” and “not farm workers” as they variously put it.106 In an 
era in which picket lines are so unusual, and in which organized protest 
over pay and working conditions is a strategy of last resort by the most 
downtrodden of all workers, the networks and studios managed to 
portray the strike as selfishness by the privileged few, rather than as a 
determined and principled stand. 
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C. Labor and the Loss of Intellectual Property Rights 
Staff writers and showrunners alike identify with labor as they 
describe how they feel about being dispossessed of the copyrights in 
their work. A number of writers connected unionization to the work-for-
hire doctrine of copyright law, under which the entity who hires a per-
son to write either as an employee or on commission becomes not only 
the owner of the copyright but also its legal author. They see unioniza-
tion as a necessary trade-off for the loss of intellectual property rights. 
A showrunner and creator of a hugely acclaimed show put the case for 
writers being labor succinctly: “What’s the thing Walter Benjamin says, 
that the ideal business is prostitution—the workers own the means of 
production?” He continued, explaining that his show has made millions 
of dollars, “What should I be getting? I can’t get caught [as a millionaire] 
complaining about it, but it is not a just distribution.”107 As the former 
showrunner of another successful show explained: 
So the thing is that, you are spending an incredible amount of 
time to create material that then you don’t get that. . . . So, you 
know, I had no ownership in [the show he ran] and that was the 
number one show. I was paid a fee and, you know, and these 
companies just make gazillions of dollars.108 
He described himself as labor and as someone who needs the protection 
of a union because his contract says he is working for a studio and that 
he does not own the rights in the show he creates. 
D. Artistic Integrity 
Finally, writers identify with labor because they feel that their 
disavowal of the network or studio heads as management safeguards 
the prestige that TV writers as a group have successfully accrued over 
the last twenty years. By and large, staff writers and showrunners 
unite over their shared alienation from the studio: they are labor 
because they agree to resist creative input from the studio and network. 
Staff writers and showrunners in my interviews described a shared 
craft identity as writers that requires a united front against creative 
input from network and studio executives. In this respect, to be a writer 
was to resist being too responsive to, or even aware of, the desires of 
employers. 
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At the same time, both showrunners and staff writers describe 
creative control in distinctly legal terms when discussing ownership, 
their contracts, and what it means to be an employee. As a showrunner 
explained, when writers feel that “the showrunner’s just going in a, a 
direction that the rest of the staff doesn’t feel is the right direction, [he 
advises them] ‘it’s the showrunner’s show.’”109 But he qualified, of 
course “the showrunner has to then turn around and say, ‘It’s the 
studio’s show.’”110 A staff writer described the additional layer of 
obligation: “When you’re hired as a TV writer, your job is to execute the 
showrunner’s vision. Your job is not to write the best show that you 
want to write.”111 
Showrunners portray themselves as labor in describing incidents 
when the studio or network threatened their creative control as writers. 
In my interviews, showrunners objected a bit to the legal fact of a 
corporation’s ownership of their work, not all to their compensation or 
working conditions, but vociferously about those who demanded 
revisions to that work. A senior writer and creator of a number of shows 
of the 1980s articulated a complaint from the earliest days of television: 
that it is nearly unbearable to be told how to write by someone who 
doesn’t write.112 He despised “getting nitpicked on every script” by 
young network executives who had “no idea what’s going on in the 
world.”113 Another writer explained that when she was working on a 
critically acclaimed show of the late 1990s, they didn’t get many notes 
because critics admired the offbeat and inventive quality of the show, 
so “it was very hard for them to tell us what to do.”114 But she did 
recount with obvious amusement a huge battle with the network over 
whether two female characters could kiss: “We finally got down to like, 
they can kiss once, but not twice, because twice means they liked it. I’m 
not kidding—that was the note.”115 She compared the autonomy that 
the critical acclaim earned for that show with terrible creative 
experiences she had with another network and a well-known studio, 
which were “enormously distrustful of my ability to write the show; it 
felt like they would just hammer you with notes till the point where you 
just started doing defensive writing, like ‘I’ll write anything you want 
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me to if you’ll stop yelling at me.’”116 Among those we interviewed, 
showrunners’ distaste at ceding creative control to network and/or 
studio executives ran far in excess of their distaste at ceding their 
copyrights to those who employed them.117 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Hollywood was a gig economy long before the gig economy was a 
thing. It has long had workers working short-term jobs with little su-
pervision who might theoretically be deemed independent contractors 
even though the most important aspect of their work—its content—is 
subject to control by network and studio executives. The right to dictate 
revisions is what defines a writer as an employee in Hollywood, and the 
ability of writers to unionize is what has made writing a good job. 
Hollywood—at least in television writing—is also a workplace in 
which nominal supervisors (showrunners) are employees who belong to 
the same union as the employees whom they hire and fire and with 
whom they work. Not a single one of the thirty-two writers interviewed 
for this project identified that as a problem for the rank and file, the 
studios, or the networks that exercise the real power. But almost all of 
them recognize that the ability of writers to bargain effectively over 
compensation and intellectual property rights depends on showrunners 
being in the Writers Guild so that studios cannot break the periodic 
strikes by forcing showrunners to cross writers’ picket lines. 
Of course, work as a Hollywood writer is unrepresentative of many, 
many other occupations. One cannot suggest it is a model for app-based 
ride-hailing, or low-wage or unskilled work. But film, radio, and televi-
sion writing from the 1930s to the present bear more than passing sim-
ilarity to some forms of high-skilled work that has gig-economy quali-
ties, including software and video game development and web design. 
This history suggests, even if it does not conclusively demonstrate the 
truth of, three important insights about employee classifications, labor 
law, and antitrust law in the gig economy. 
First: Collective bargaining has enabled writers to negotiate better 
compensation, health and pension benefits, recognition, and novel 
forms of profit-sharing and intellectual property rights that would not 
exist but for unionization. 
Second: Independent workers should not uniformly be deemed to 
be independent contractors whose concerted activity is unprotected by 
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the NLRA and prohibited by antitrust law. The definition of independ-
ent contractor could be substantially narrowed without doing violence 
to the purpose or policy of labor law and antitrust law. There has been 
robust competition over terms of employment and in hiring writers. Tel-
evision and film production have thrived even with talent guilds. 
Third: Collective bargaining by writers who exercise supervisory 
and production executive roles has contributed to the successes of the 
Writers Guild. Thus, contrary to the notion that supervisors must be 
excluded from the protections of bargaining to protect either the em-
ployer or the rank and file from the conflicted loyalties of the supervi-
sor, the inclusion of showrunners in the Writers Guild and its collec-
tively bargained protections is one of the things that has preserved the 
ability of writers to bargain at all. 
Hollywood writers are neither independent contractors nor super-
visors under current law. But if they were organizing for the first time 
now, I would wager that the studios and networks would argue that 
writers are either or both independent contractors and supervisors, just 
exactly as the studios and production companies argued in the 1930s 
for screen writers, the 1940s for radio writers, and the 1950s for TV 
writers. The lesson that should be drawn from the experience of the 
writers’ union in Hollywood is that the gig economy should embrace 
bargaining by independent workers in order to realize the potential of 
the disruptive economy of the future. 
